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HOW MUCH IS THAT DOGGY IN THE WINDOW?
THE INEVITABLY UNSATISFYING DUTY TO
MONETIZE
Adam F. Scales*
Einstein appears in front of a blackboard. Before him is an impenetrable
string of equations, ending, improbably, with a dollar sign. The caption
reads, “Einstein discovers that time is actually money.” 1

INTRODUCTION
It is impossible to imagine effective teaching or scholarship across a
range of disciplines within the legal academy without some reference to
economics. Impossible today, that is. Generations of students and
professors did serviceably well before the ongoing transformation of the
law school into a thoroughgoing academic discipline. Economic analysis
most influentially embodies that ambition.
Refracting legal and
administrative decision-making through the lens of quantified risks and
benefits is not simply desirable, it is inevitable. Indeed, a central
descriptive claim of law and economics is that efficiency and social welfare
concerns have always animated legal processes. The descriptive and
normative claims of law and economics are, of course, open to debate.
What is assuredly true is that students of the law—regardless of which side
of the podium they find themselves—must at some point consider the
material constraints on policy.
I have been asked to respond to Professor Kip Viscusi’s contribution to
this Symposium, “Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental
Regulation.” 2 Professor Viscusi is the leading proponent of cost-benefit
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to the Journal
for inviting me to contribute to this Symposium. Peter Siegelman, Jeff Lubbers, Richard
Parker, and Kurt Strasser all provided invaluable comments, though this should not be held
against them. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Viscusi, whose provocative research has
stimulated in me both unexpected disagreement, and an eagerness for further inquiry.
1. GARY LARSON, THE FAR SIDE GALLERY 2, 33 (2003).
2. W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006) [hereinafter Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits].
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analysis as it applies to regulation. He is an astonishingly prolific scholar,
and his work has been as influential within the academy as it has in the
field.
As a commenter, I am thus fortunate that this piece breaks no new
ground, but instead reviews the theory and application of cost-benefit
analysis. The range of scholarship on the topic is vast and often technical;
Professor Viscusi is the rare scholar who can cite extensively to his own
work without appearing immodest. That is of immense value to the
commenter, as it helps him trace for the reader the context of Viscusi’s
work and some of the increasingly formal critical responses thereto.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Learned Hand would no doubt be pleased to see the remarkable sweep of
the formula that bears his name. 3 Unchained from the colorful—if
epistemologically inapposite—facts of Carroll Towing, 4 cost-benefit
analysis now occupies a central role in administrative regulation. Viscusi
describes the relatively recent promulgation by the United States Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) of standards to guide federal agencies as
they consider very explicit tradeoffs among health outcomes, direct
These
compliance costs, and the diverse outputs of regulation.5
considerations are essential to enable policymakers to make rational and
consistent risk decisions across different policy domains. 6 It is important
to know that, for example, Regulation X leaves society better off if enacted.
Somewhat less obviously, we ought to prefer Regulation Y to Regulation X
if Y leaves us even better off. In a world of constrained regulatory
3. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Hand’s rule for
negligence, simply stated, holds that when P is the probability of an event, L the amount of
loss resulting from that event, and B the burden on the defendant to prevent the event from
occurring, negligence results where B < P(L). Id. at 173.
4. See Stephen G. Gilles, U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formula’s Home
Port, in TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
5. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
6. One might distinguish the need for consistency across the spectrum of regulatory
risk choices from those made by individuals. Viscusi offers intriguing data suggesting a
great deal of correlation between different types of individual risk choices not obviously
related to one another. For example, he presents data showing that smokers are ten percent
less likely to wear seatbelts and twice as likely to suffer an accident at home. Nor do they
floss as often as nonsmokers. Id. at XX. This implies that there is some underlying taste for
risk that expresses itself across different choices. But this does not entail that individuals
consistently express these tastes, even though risk tendencies can be observed at the level of
populations. The upshot for Viscusi’s analysis is this: perhaps it is desirable to determine
regulatory policy based on consistent risk preferences. But this ought not to be confused
with an observation that, in fact, individuals do so (with the implication that risk-consistent
regulatory policies merely instantiate that preference).
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possibilities, some mechanism is needed to sort out the good ideas from the
bad, as well as the better ideas from the merely good.
Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) offers such a mechanism. But because
“costs” are initially denominated in dollars and “benefits” typically do not
self-denominate accordingly, direct comparisons are difficult. Instead,
researchers have derived estimates of dollar values from observed market
behavior and survey data. Human health and safety are sometimes directly
traded (as in the provision of health care or shelter). More often than not,
however, we can only observe transactions in which health and safety
considerations are merely implicit. Statistical tools are employed to tease
out the component of the transaction (say a wage premium) that is thought
to be attributable to risk. Thus armed with the “market rate” for a quantum
and type of health risk, one can infer what an actual market would look like
for a spectrum of risk portfolios.
These market estimates may be supplemented with survey data.
Contingent valuation is a process wherein participants are asked to behave
like market actors where they may transact for health and safetydenominated goods. A famous example is the fascinating if unwieldy
finding that shoppers in Greensboro, North Carolina state a willingness to
pay $883,000 to avoid a lifetime of chronic bronchitis.7
These observations reach fructuation with the concept of VSL, or “value
of a statistical life.” As the name implies, and Viscusi is careful to note,
the term describes a sum of money, which for regulatory purposes may be
regarded as equivalent to society’s willingness to pay to avoid the loss of a
human life. 8 VSL is a thought experiment that assigns a monetary value to
the benefits of regulatory choices—an experiment that is itself derived
from the natural and artificial experiments sketched above. VSL
methodology has been in use for decades, though it has seen increasing
refinement (and a dramatic rise in inferred values) since the late 1980s.
There is much to commend the VSL concept. Every torts teacher walks
his class through a series of hypothetical scenarios involving road safety or
some other good, and asks some lucky student how much we should spend
to make cars safer. Every year, someone resists, drawn by some
innominate and inarticulable sense that such comparisons are simply
wrong. After a few laps around the rhetoric of risk reduction, the nowunfortunate student confesses that, yes, it doesn’t make sense to spend $4
trillion to save an inattentive driver’s life, but, no—making such tradeoffs

7. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
EVERYTHING, AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 96 (2005).
8. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
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is still wrong.
There are actually more sophisticated arguments, from a variety of
perspectives on this score, 9 but at the end of the day we must decide
whether to spend X dollars (rather than X-n, or X+n), on safety. We
deserve to know what we’re getting for our money. The regulatory
bureaucracy has largely embraced VSL, and Viscusi and others deserve
credit for insisting on the use of economic tools in making decisions with
economic consequences. 10
Moreover, while the range of VSLs computed (and, somewhat
discouragingly, actually used) varies significantly (between $1 million and
$30 million), it is interesting to note, as Viscusi observes, that there is
significant clustering of estimates.11 In other words, the methodologies
commonly employed do not derive values of $50,000 for one domain, and
$3 billion for another. This suggests that VSL methodology is in fact
measuring something with modest consistency.
I think it appropriate to emphasize those important qualifiers:
“something” and “modest.” The CBA project is an impressive, ongoing
technical achievement. If one believes the task of economics is to
illuminate the costs of social choices, as I do, Professor Viscusi has done
much to illuminate the costs of regulation. The state of the art is such, he
argues, that relatively minor disputes about methodology should not
obscure the necessity and benefit of CBA.12 But I believe the reach of this
science has exceeded its present grasp; as a “back of the envelope” admirer
of law and economics, I am in the uncomfortable position of finding that
admiration somewhat dulled by my inquiries here.
Willingness To Pay
Let us consider first the willingness-to-pay measure (“WTP”). From
market transactions and surveys, Viscusi and others have derived estimates
of how much people would pay to avoid small risks of death; these sums

9. See, e.g., MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Heidi Li Feldman,
Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567
(1997).
10. Richard Parker and others observe that CBA analyses lend themselves to the view
that there exists a finite regulatory budget. See Richard W. Parker, Grading the
Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1345-75 (2003). This is literally untrue. However,
the practical constraints on health and safety expenditure mean that we are very unlikely to
undertake all regulations equally; some ranking is required, and that will inevitably involve
cost-benefit calculations.
11. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
12. Id. at XX-XX (stressing the importance of cost-benefit analysis and the successful
use of various methodologies to measure it).
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may be scaled up to reflect what people ought to be willing to pay to avoid
certain death—for someone. 13 I add that term because presumably, any
individual would spend all of his wealth to avoid certain death. 14 The
disutility function of death risks (and the concomitant WTP) are non-linear.
The first problem is the selection of WTP measures.
WTP is attractive because most transactions are made for the benefit of
the transacting parties, not others. Viscusi’s theory is that our collective
willingness to pay (for safety regulation) ought to reflect the average
WTP. 15 I have no doubt that this is an attractive view among economists,
but I think it fundamentally misperceives regulatory wealth transfers. A
health regulation can be evaluated under WTP, or “willingness to accept”
(“WTA”). Viscusi observes that in experimental contexts, observed WTA
values are significantly higher than WTP. 16 There is every reason to think
that this value is closer to what citizens expect of their government because
most regulation is inherently other-regarding. The real question—or at
least one likely to lead to very different valuations—is the willingness to
impose risks on others. I call this “willingness to impose” (“WTI”)—and
Professor Viscusi can correct me if there is a more precise term extant. A
regulatory scheme that elevates WTP-derived measures over others suffers
from two deficiencies: first, it is biased in favor of market-based data,
because most WTP measures are derived therefrom. If, therefore, marketbased data is systematically biased in one direction or another, WTP-based
regulatory measures will suffer corresponding error. Secondly, it overlooks
the panoply of considerations, not captured by market observations, which
people probably entertain when exercising regulatory power over others.
Imagine a homeowner who purchases a home for $100,000. What is the
value to her? Well, it must be something more than $100,000—otherwise
the transaction would not be worthwhile. Still, her WTP is not likely to
significantly exceed $100,000. Once she takes possession, it becomes very
unlikely that her willingness to accept would not significantly exceed
$100,000. Which is the correct figure? Both are useful. It is natural to
think that individual WTP should be mirrored in collective WTP for
regulatory action, but I do not believe that most people actually think about
it this way. Consider the near-universal condemnation of Kelo v. City of
New London. 17 Legislatures have introduced bills to restrict state power to

13. Id. at XX.
14. Viscusi implies a wealth constraint, but I am not so sure. See Id. at XX; cf. infra
note 16 and accompanying text.
15. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
16. Id. at XX.
17. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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take property for private use. 18 The opinion’s author even concedes that
the outcome was unwise. 19 What explains this reaction? I suspect part of
the problem is the mismatch between WTA and WTP in such cases.
It is worth noting that Viscusi’s cited literature does in fact support this
intuition, though he does not emphasize it. When respondents are asked to
attach WTP values for risks to be borne by others (altruism), the values
thereof are reliably several times higher than self-regarding WTP. 20 I do
not understand why, in a regulatory context, self-regarding measures
should be given analytical priority. Virtually all regulation is otherregarding: for example, I am to pay (let us assume through taxation) a sum
certain to eliminate a one-in-100,000 risk of death. The risk to me
personally is trivial. The risk to one of my fellow citizens is all but
certain—I simply cannot identify him in advance. Assuming my complete
willingness to monetize risk-life tradeoffs, the regulatory deal I am being
offered is to trade a sum certain to save someone else’s life. Viscusi would
be very correct to point out that my WTP is unlikely to be limitless. But a
modest amount of empathy may reveal a true preference for enhancing
other-regarding welfare in ways not captured by my personal spending
habits. It is for this reason that I feel comfortable predicting that most
people would support an enhancement or “lodestar” approach to
compensating homeowners who lose their homes to eminent domain.
Note that something more than altruism is at work here. I use the term
WTI to illustrate that some regulatory choices21 reflect conscious decisions
to transfer resources from private to public hands. Those resources could
be physical property, unliquidated damage claims, or health status. I am
personally very skeptical of government power, so I assume that people on
whom it is necessarily inflicted for the greater good take unique umbrage.
Specifically, the claims one may validly make upon the market are very
different than those one may make as a citizen. Unreconstructed WTP
measures do not reflect this, and the mysteriously underemphasized
“altruism” enhancement may only partially describe the reluctance people
have in visiting unelected risks upon others through government.

18. See, e.g., S.F. 2750, 109th.Cong. (2006).
19. Kelo, 126 U.S. at 2668; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo; Justice
Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A1.
20. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1912, 1940 (1993).
21. I refer here to direct regulatory outlays, such as the decision to commit resources to
cleaning up a polluted stream, rather than regulation that requires private actors to pay. As
Viscusi notes in a different context, drawing this distinction permits us properly to consider
different VSLs (and thus necessarily different WTPs). See infra notes 30 and 31 and
accompanying text.
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VSL analysis does not deal easily with entitlements that people do not
consistently express across time, different wealth states, or market and nonmarket domains. There is, of course, a great deal of literature on this topic,
and I am skeptical whether measures emphasized by Viscusi adequately
account for its insights. If so, then his analysis will systematically
undervalue the benefits of regulatory action (or, expressed another way,
undervalue the costs of health risk transfers).
Viscusi points out a number of improvements that robust CBA analysis
provides over prior metrics. 22 For one thing, it offers a syntax for
describing benefits (such as visibility due to improved air quality) that
simply could not be expressed with commensurable precision otherwise.23
Moreover, WTP measures, in theory, are better suited for capturing losses
for death or pain that the tort system, with frustrating formality, insists on
characterizing in strictly pecuniary terms (i.e., most states nominally permit
wrongful death damages to account for loss of income, not an abstract
value for loss of life). 24
Nonetheless, the economic analyses Viscusi describes often insert
assumptions that “flatten” or smooth out what will in reality tend to be
rather lumpy distributions. For example, in describing a hypothetical
chemical regulation, he states that the relevant benefit outcome against
which costs are to be measured is the mean value of the distribution based
on the dose-response relationship. 25 This is plausible, but relies heavily on
a measure of risk indifference that exists only in economic models. As
Viscusi correctly notes, individuals’ responses to deaths or injuries are not
uniform; they may have a particular fear of cancer, or of disfigurement.26
This may cause them to assign outsized values to particular risks. Viscusi
recognizes this limitation, but only as a source of possible error in
regulatory decisions. He does not assign it independent weight as a data
point that might be used to shape the “correct” regulatory response. This is
a rather thin conception of regulatory rationality, to which I shall return
later.
Calculating VSLs
Viscusi provides a revealing example for using VSL. He imagines,
similarly to my example above, a one-in-100,000 risk of death that can be

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
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eliminated.27 The question is, “how much would you pay” to do so? If the
answer is $70, then there is an implied VSL of $7 million.28 The first item
of note is the strong appeal to insurance analogy. The problem is that
insurance behavior rarely looks anything like this. People exhibit all kinds
of irrational preferences, under-insuring relative to the expected value of
their earnings (including this author, a professor of insurance law), and
over-insuring relative to the likelihood of certain, highly-salient risks (such
as accidents). 29 This poses a fundamental problem for VSL methodology
because life insurance is about as close a transaction as it is possible to find
in which individuals self-valuate. If the reasonably transparent life
insurance market is an extremely unreliable indicator of life values, it is not
clear why esoteric decisions regarding seat belts, smoking, or implicit wage
premia would be better.
Another point is subtle. Viscusi observes that, as we are dealing with
small risks of death in most regulatory actions, the VSL implied by the
above hypothetical need not be constrained by the present value of the
individual’s wealth.30 He then links this observation with the recognition
that the implied VSL would be “different” for much greater risks.31
Different, indeed; the VSL would be astronomically higher. For example, I
am an unusually risk-averse person. My students always make fun of my
grandmotherly driving habits. But I suppose I would be willing to play
Regulatory Roulette: for $100,000 I am willing to sell the right to expose
myself to a one-in-100 risk of immediate death. But for a five percent
chance, I would not take less than $1 million. And it only goes up from
there.
Viscusi has acknowledged previously that the heterogeneity of risk
preferences limits the generalizability of implied VSLs. 32 But this is also
the case—perhaps dramatically so—with risk-variant VSLs. But Viscusi
does not suggest, nor do the regulatory examples he cites imply, that the
VSL used in evaluating regulations imposing one-in-100,000 risks are
adjusted upwards when one-in-10,000 risks are under consideration.
Putting these two ideas together, it is clear just how much “smoothing” is
required by Viscusi’s model: not only is the amount of risk preference

27. Id. at __.
28. Id. at __.
29. See generally Kyle Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2002); Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog:
The Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L. REV. 173 (2000).
30. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
31. Id.
32. Id. at XX.
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certain to be wrong for almost everyone (though correct for that hardy
staple of economic thought, the average person), but the VSL would be
correct for him only with respect to—at best—the average risk-imposing
regulation. And even this modest illumination depends critically on the
accuracy of stated preference and implied risk premium calculations, and
the robustness with which they can describe varying levels of risk.
I offer a final observation regarding this example. While a perfectlyfunctioning explicit market for risk would likely constrain an individual’s
risk-eliminating purchasing power to something like the present value of
his wealth, there is no reason to suppose this constraint applies equally to
all implicit political markets in risk. All government activity is
redistributive; the question is simply the opacity with which the
redistribution takes place. VSL methodology seeks a kind of “soft”
internalization of regulatory costs among risk-affected populations. I find
this personally appealing, but that is largely because I find redistribution
generally unappealing. But that is not how political processes work, and
most people would not agree with my Paleolithic views. If this is so, then
we must ask whether markets are truly revealing collective preferences.33
Moreover, limiting the VSL to “owned” wealth ignores the diverse
sources of wealth individuals may call upon under exigency: family, public
appeals to charity, and of course direct government intervention. As many
of these are in fact observable—a point I develop later—I am puzzled as to
why these sources should not be included in the WTP calculus.
Bronchitis and Potato Chips
When I was in law school, I had the privilege of being a research
assistant for a distinguished scholar I will not impugn by association here.
He asked me to research the then-emerging field of contingent valuation
methodology (“CVM”). I found that the state of the art was well-described
by a cheeky law review title, “Ask a Silly Question . . . ”. 34
Professor Viscusi and others have elaborated considerably on the simple
methods then available to probe preferences that cannot be naturally
observed. Their refinements can be seen in the indirectness with which
valuation questions are posed, and the use of iterative choices to “close” the
expressed preferences of research subjects. Moreover, some of the early
inconsistencies described in the CVM literature (apparent indifference to

33. See infra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of “collective” decisionmaking versus aggregated individual decisions.
34. Note, “Ask A Silly Question . . .”: Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource
Damages, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1981 (1992) [hereinafter Ask a Silly Question].
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the numbers of species saved per unit of cost) have been overcome to the
point that a surface plausibility emerges. For example, in a study Viscusi
co-authored several years ago, respondents considered risks of treatable
and non-treatable diseases and accidents.35 Unsurprisingly, people treat the
disutility of terminal cancer and a fatal crash very similarly. 36 Cleverly,
Viscusi corroborated these putative preferences by generating survey data
tied to the physical consequences (not simply the names) of the diseases.37
The correlation is strong, indicating that people are being relatively
consistent in their responses.
I find this work elegant and fascinating. The mathematics are cunningly
worked out, and as someone who studies the allocation of injury and
disease costs, I cannot help but be inspired to develop the empirical chops
necessarily to explore such findings more fully. The problem is, I can’t get
the ATMs out of my mind.
I refer to the computerized testing machines that researchers have wisely
substituted for human interrogators in these surveys. 38 Respondents
answer questions appearing before them on a computer monitor. We are
thus deriving our estimates of the value of human life from bored shoppers
in a North Carolina mall who ponder the price of avoiding chronic
bronchitis in between slurps of Orange Julius. I would not expect these
people to be able to correctly identify the Chairman of the Federal Reserve,
the approximate size of the federal budget, or their own Congressman. If
they could define “MRI,” I would be astounded if they knew its
approximate cost (many doctors did not as late as fifteen years ago). They
certainly would misstate the relative likelihood of sustaining a head injury
in car collisions across different models, are still unsure how to operate
ABS, and would be floored to discover that only 4.2 percent of deaths
result from accident.
Why on earth would we care to hear their opinions about how much they
might accept in return for chronic bronchitis—a sum not one in a thousand
has ever seen? In what way does their apparent expertise in selecting
detergent and potato chips for national marketing qualify them to determine
the regulatory policy of the Environmental Protection Agency? Asking
someone how much she might pay to avoid a disease so far outside of
common experience that the researcher must take pains to educate her in

35. Wesley Magat et al., A Reference Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI.
1118, 1119 (1996).
36. Id. at 1123.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1122.
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advance 39 is not simply a silly question; it is a wholly fantastical
question. 40
At this point, I have a perhaps-silly question of my own. Do CBA
proponents have the same confidence in civil juries?41 My inquiries have
only scratched the surface of Professor Viscusi’s work. I am hesitant—
more so I suspect than Professors Heinzerling and Ackerman 42—to impute
to it the broadly deregulatory agenda with which some CBA enthusiasts
are, interestingly enough, also allied. Therefore, let me address the
question to myself. I am gravely skeptical of the competence of juries to
assess even modestly complex risk-relevant information. The misleadingly
one-dimensional character of tort litigation systematically biases jurors to
elevate presently materialized risks over those external to the case at hand.
The limited (and adversarial) guidance given to jurors when they assess
compensation would be unthinkable in nearly any other public decisionmaking context. Certainly, there are matters of reasonableness I would
sooner entrust to the first twelve people I could find in Central Park, rather
than the elite and entirely unrepresentative and impractical professoriate I
know so well. But just as I would not trust those twelve people to
recommend medication to me or deliver a baby, I see little reason to
imagine they are competent to evaluate the physician who does,
particularly in view of the systematic ways civil trials inhibit the rational
processing of information. 43
Next to the survey methods on which Professor Viscusi lays such
emphasis, the civil jury trial is practically a contemporary policy seminar!
Nor am I impressed with the observed “stability” of iterative choice
methods he describes. 44 Twenty-five or more jury verdicts are highly likely
to yield an accurate assessment of Merck’s average liability for Vioxx
cases. Like the surveys, this is an interesting number, and it can be put to
some use. But for all we know, the juries merely express the same
cognitive limitations iteration after iteration; consistency must not be
mistaken for external truth.

39. Id. at 1121.
40. It would be equally informative (and perhaps more entertaining) to drop this author
onto the set of “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” and ask him to differentiate between logit,
probit and Tobit, which numerate readers will quickly recognize as the kind of linear
regression models econometricians such as Viscusi commonly employ.
41. Evidently not. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of
Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001) [hereinafter Viscusi, Jurors, Judges].
42. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 56-59.
43. Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, supra note 41, at 135.
44. See, e.g., Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
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Wage Differentials
Although the method sketched above is employed to fill in certain
valuation gaps, Viscusi is careful to note that they are not actual
decisions. 45 The true test of individuals’ values for risk comes from market
data. Workers will be compensated for risky work, and consumers will pay
less for risky products (expressed here as a premium for safe products).
Summarizing his recent meta-analysis of wage-risk differential data from
dozens of studies, Viscusi derives a median VSL of $6.7 million (adjusted
to $7.1 million for inflation). 46 Looking at a number of products-related
surveys, VSLs are also clustered around $4-5 million, across a spectrum of
purchase decisions. 47
It is indeed interesting to note the general consistency of these
valuations. This consistency matches neatly with the theoretical prediction
that rational actors with a certain and stable taste for risk should act
consistently with that taste across their various activities. Perhaps too
neatly. I certainly find the theory plausible, and would have assumed
(subject to qualification) that it was likely to be borne out by examination.
In preparation for receiving Professor Viscusi’s paper, I read up on
VSLs. I read Priceless, 48 and other works from different schools of
thought within labor economics. 49 One fact leapt out at me: the observed
risk premia were astonishingly small. Ackerman and Heinzerling reported
typical premia of thirty cents per hour, rising to about one dollar per hour
for the handful of riskiest jobs. 50 Two thousand dollars a year? I must
confess my surprise. Perhaps I was imagining high value-added jobs
(putting out oil fires) when I should have been thinking about convenience
store employees. Sure enough, Viscusi describes a hypothetical typical
worker exposed to a one-in-25,000 risk who receives an implied premium
of $268 annually. 51
From an actuarial standpoint, the math works out fine. But my
immediate intuition was one of skepticism: what is the signal (risk
premium) to noise (myriad factors determining compensation) ratio here?

45. Id. at __.
46. Id. at __.
47. Id. at __.
48. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7.
49. See, e.g., Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work
Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (1998); Morley Gunderson & Douglass Hyatt,
Workplace Risks and Wages: Canadian Evidence From Alternative Models, 34 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 377 (2001).
50. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 80.
51. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
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An amount of $268 is less than one percent of the average annual wage in
the United States.52 Assuming that a risk premium is an innate component
of compensation, I wonder about how reliably we can ascertain it.
Let me emphasize my relative unfamiliarity with labor economics and
statistics. Viscusi has surely forgotten more than I am likely to learn. Yet,
I cannot help but notice that many of these studies draw from diverse data
sets compiled at different times for different purposes. Each has its own set
of assumptions, limitations and “patches.” This is not unique to labor
economics, but is a fundamental challenge throughout social science; one
can almost never observe everything with consistency. It is common for
such studies to rely in part on datasets that are twenty years old. I do not
see how simply adjusting for inflation could possibly yield accurate values,
across many dimensions, for today’s workforce. That problem is only
compounded when one considers the long-tail nature of regulatory
decisions. The best snapshot of the world today will be used to guide risk
decisions impacting people twenty years from now.
There is no obviously correct solution to this problem, and paralysis by
analysis is uniquely unattractive. But certainly we must proceed with great
caution before setting too much store beside our already-outdated
calculations. One need only observe the profound changes in VSL
methodology and results Viscusi describes as having occurred in a
relatively short time to confirm this.53
These cautionary notes would ring true in a world of perfectly
competitive labor markets. Labor markets, however, are not perfectly
competitive. A number of scholars have reported that minorities, women,
and other disadvantaged workers are less likely to command wage premia
commensurate with risky work. 54 Viscusi reports also that smokers are
more likely to be injured, controlling for job risk, and has elsewhere

52. Social Security Online, Average Wage Index (AWI), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/awidevelop.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
53. Viscusi says that VSLs have been stable for some time. Viscusi, Monetizing the
Benefits, supra note 2, at __. But I believe he must be referring to research done over the
past twenty years or so.
54. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job Injury
Risks, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 598 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Difference in Labor Market
Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239 (2003). Hersch (and Viscusi) do
note the presence of compensating differentials for women, but Hersch’s data imply a lower
VSL for women; it is likely that either the data are insufficiently resolved to point to the
correct VSL (which I believe may be Hersch’s interpretation, see Hersch, supra, at 607), or
women workers may simply be “unlucky,” in Dorman and Hagstrom’s terms. See Dorman
& Hagstrom, supra note 49, at 133. The strong hand of noncompetitive factors in
determining wage-risk tradeoffs counsels caution in extrapolating regulatory policy from
voluminous, yet misleading, data.
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adduced data that smokers require smaller wage-risk premia. 55 Again, this
points towards the conclusion that wage-risk measures capture some
underlying preference for risk. But, unless workers express this preference
consistently (within the heterogeneous domains different workers inhabit),
it is unclear how this observation should be translated into regulatory
policy, except in a general way. This is a perennial problem with VSL
methodology: one is required to have robust confidence in the observable
expression of risk preferences and the ability to scale those preferences up
to a regulated domain that may involve different or unobservable risk
preferences. The many caveats that appear throughout the underlying VSL
literature are not in my view consistent with such confidence.
The sex- and race-related data illustrate this problem of extrapolation.
Heinzerling and Ackerman suggest that not only are women less likely to
command wage premia (presumably because of discrimination), 56 but are
significantly more risk averse—perhaps six or seven times more so than
men. 57 Most risky jobs are held by men. Ought not the VSL for regulatory
purposes be adjusted upwards? After all, environmental health regulation
affects everybody, not just men. If women really are six times more risk
averse than men (at least with respect to environmental hazards), then the
population-level VSL should be approximately three times higher.
Viscusi himself recognizes that VSLs for regulatory purposes might
appropriately vary depending on the character of the regulation.58 Using
his example of airline safety versus road safety, 59 I would generalize as
follows: where the regulation supplements a market transaction, the
regulation should reflect, as best as we can determine, the expressed VSL
of the affected population.60 Therefore, if we really knew that workers
55. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences in
Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 15 J. HUM. RESOURCES 202 (1990).
56. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 78. Viscusi, relying on Hersch, replies
that women do in fact command wage-risk premia. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra
note 2, at XX. But I do not read Hersch to assert that these premia are commensurate with
higher levels of risk aversion.
57. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
58. Id. at XX.
59. Id. at XX. Viscusi suggests that the higher incomes of airline passengers should
determine higher regulated investments in airline safety—and perhaps higher than what
should be imposed on members of the general population (whose lower income implies a
lower VSL). Id.
60. My generalization is incomplete; at some point, the transaction costs of an imagined
private transaction are so high, it is no longer sensible to speak of the “market” at work at
all. For example, perhaps it is plausible to assume that residents in a factory town are
capable of reaching some arrangement as to pollution-employment tradeoffs that reasonably
reflect their preferences. However, if the affected population is dispersed over hundreds of
miles from a pollution source, it is perhaps better to regard regulation not as a response to an
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valued their lives at $7.1 million, that figure is an appropriate basis for
filling the “gaps” in worker safety measures privately agreed. On the other
hand, if we are funding health measures from a public regulatory budget for
general benefit, we will necessarily consider a more diverse set of risk
preferences (along with the WTI and WTA considerations described
earlier). Given this concession, should we confine VSLs derived from
wage-risk studies to the task of workplace regulation (of risk-preferring
white guys)? Actually, there may be unexpected wisdom there. Workers
with the highest VSLs may represent the heterogeneity of risk preference
(as I believe Viscusi would argue), or may represent the furthest plausible
range of life valuations derivable from market studies. Why should not that
highest expressed value, rather than average VSL, be used for regulatory
decisions, at least for “public” or “market-forcing” regulations?
Product Safety and Heroic Interventions
With regard to products-based risk-differentials, my perspective is
constrained by years of studying and teaching products liability. That
experience has confirmed that the average person knows almost nothing
about product safety. Professor Viscusi provides only a brief resume of
WTP measures derived from seatbelt usage decisions and purchases of new
cars. 61 I have looked only at some of this data. Calculating a VSL based
on the fraction of work-opportunity cost expended by putting on a seatbelt
is facetious. 62 Moreover, I happen to be a car fanatic, and follow the auto
market with some care. I cannot accept as plausible the suggestion that
rising car prices reflect rising safety levels.63 How do competitive market
models for risk account for the fact that, until quite recently, manufacturers
were pulling down a profit of $15,000 on their larger SUVs despite the fact
that they are not safer than mid- or full-sized cars, as many people
imagine? 64 There is so much “noise” in the automotive purchase decision
that I cannot believe it resolves VSLs with the superfine granularity
Professor Viscusi discerns.
One of the interesting questions Viscusi raises is whether VSL
imperfectly-executed transaction, but rather as a substitute for a failed one.
61. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph Aldy, The Value of A Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 25-26 (2003).
62. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX (referring to Viscusi & Aldy’s
literature review cited supra, note 61, at 24).
63. Certainly, this is true in the Yugo and Daewoo stratum, but many luxury cars have
lower crash test scores than family sedans.
64. See Michelene Maynard, Trading the Hummer for a Honda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2006, at C1; NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC & SAFETY ADMIN., PASSENGER VEHICLE OCCUPANT
FATALITY RATES BY TYPE AND SIZE OF VEHICLE (2006).
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methodology can be used to guide the kind of emergency intervention
decisions that are familiar to anyone who watches television.65 Images like
that of a girl trapped in a well, or of coal miners trapped in a subterranean
shaft, often inspire heroic efforts at rescue. Rarely if ever is there any
discussion of cost—except perhaps to impress the observer with the size
and rarity of equipment being used. Viscusi does not directly answer his
own question, which is itself interesting. Instead, he asks whether society
would be willing to make equivalent expenditures to rescue, for example,
the 45,000 people killed each year in traffic accidents.66
This is a fair question. I detect little enthusiasm for posting a full
complement of EMTs at every traffic stop. But Professor Viscusi might do
well to reflect on his question from the perspective of the economist that he
is. These heroic interventions represent natural experiments rich with data.
In each, we have a collective decision being made to save a number of lives
identifiable with the kind of precision of which regulatory economists can
only dream. Are these not the very best data points from which to derive
society’s willingness to pay for human life? At a minimum, it would be
interesting to observe at what points of expenditure safety officials (with
tacit public consent) conclude that they have done all that they reasonably
can. This explicit decision data might be blended with other (often implicit
and difficult to measure) data from market studies to arrive at a more
nuanced approximation of social WTP.67
Risk-Risk Tradeoffs
Viscusi points to additional indirect costs of regulation.68 He then
applies a measure he has previously derived for propensity to spend income
on health (and finds that it is 0.1). 69 Therefore, a $1 million loss of wealth
implies $100,000 less spent on health. Applying a simple VSL, he
concludes that $70 million of regulation results in the loss of one statistical
life. 70 Viscusi notes that other “propensity” measures and different VSLs
obviously result in very different calculations. 71
65. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
66. Id. at XX.
67. One might argue that decisions made while a telegenic family pleads before the
cameras for a child’s rescue may be a far cry from the dispassionate analysis said to be the
strength of regulatory decision-making. I agree, but Viscusi does not subject market
determinations to the same scrutiny. These decisions may be just as irrational (though
informative) as any other decision.
68. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
69. Id. at __.
70. Id.
71. Id. at __.
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This small methodological point must nevertheless be kept firmly in
mind. The econometric measures that Viscusi finds plausible will generate
dramatically different estimates of the number of “statistical murders”72
caused by inefficient regulation. There is a tendency, both in Viscusi’s
own work and in this field generally, for regulatory assessments to
bootstrap such data into concrete without qualifying it as the inferential
leap that it is. Policymakers would do well to recover from CBA
enthusiasts the measure of uncertainty that their own analyses often reveal.
I suppose one should regret any number of statistical murders. But might
not we feel somewhat differently if the number is 20,000 (or 200,000)
annually? Very modest changes in econometric assumptions can generate
order-of-magnitude changes.
On some level, Viscusi’s observation must be sound. One can easily
imagine a workplace regulation that is so costly, the employer cannot
afford to operate, and the employees lose their jobs. No doubt, one could
trace the effects of these layoffs as they reverberate through the economy
(though Professor Ackerman suggests some unrecognized complications
here). 73 Viscusi’s observation seeks to instantiate the inevitable tradeoff at
the level of individual health expenditures. I do not find this persuasive for
several reasons.
Defining health expenditure for purposes of measuring the “propensity
effect” is very difficult, and relies on proxies that are unlikely to capture
heterogeneous preferences perfectly. Gym memberships, health insurance,
refraining from eating fatty foods, and drinking a daily glass of wine are all
activities that can be expressed as expenditures, although they have
different consequences and implicate preferences that cannot be generically
described. Again, I take it that (as Viscusi tantalizingly suggests is true of
smokers’ behavior) action in one health-related domain is unlikely to be
totally uncorrelated with action in another.74 But the correlation would
have to be high, and the effect uniform, if we are to predicate quantitative
policy on such observations.
Second, an early study on this subject observed great income elasticity,
which is what one would expect. In other words, the propensity effect falls
sharply above modest incomes. 75 This is not surprising. In the absence of

72. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 54 (attributing to John Graham the
term “statistical murder” to describe the risk-risk tradeoffs implied by regulatory
expenditures).
73. See Frank Ackerman, The Unbearable Lightness of Regulatory Costs, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. XX (2006).
74. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
75. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 57.
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a serious medical condition, how much health expense does one need?
Once a threshold of averageness or typicality is reached (say, the
approximately $10,000 it costs to insure a family of four), it is implausible
that additional income will linearly be spent on health care. Even more
problematic for Viscusi’s claim is that marginal expenditures above a
certain range are highly unlikely to return equivalent health benefits.
For example, I wear very expensive glasses. This is due to a
combination of the stylish frames I fancy and my preference for the
thinnest possible lens. This is called “indexing,” and the process easily
doubles the cost of my lenses. Undoubtedly, I could not afford this
indulgence if I earned half of my present salary, but in no way does this
improve my health; it just makes me think I’m more attractive to women.
That is perhaps an important determinant of my mental health, but it strains
credulity to suppose that if 35,000 people each spent $200 less on
eyeglasses, one of them will wind up dead. I imagine that Viscusi would
agree with this, but he does not sufficiently qualify his observations to
confirm that they cannot be taken literally across all iterations of health
expenditure.
A similar problem appears when one considers the distribution of
regulatory costs. Viscusi’s analysis lends itself to the characterization of
distributional uniformity; that is, one imagines that the regulatory “tax” is
imposed per capita, making possible the easy arithmetic that leads to a
marginal reduction in health expenditure. But there are no environmental
regulations that actually work this way. We may divide regulatory burdens
into two categories. The first, direct burdens, extract resources from
citizens (say, the administrative expenses of the Enviornmental Protection
Agency (EPA)). Many regulatory burdens, however, are indirect. For
example, the EPA requires pollution controls, the costs of which are likely
to be passed on to consumers.
Direct burdens are not distributed equally. Many people pay no income
tax at all, which means they will only receive the benefits of health and
safety measures funded by the government. It is interesting to observe that,
assuming the propensity effect does in fact fade with income, there may be
little to it at the income strata where people are actually burdened.
Of course, certain direct burdens are broad-based. Many people who do
not pay income tax pay taxes on gasoline. Again, however, the distribution
of gasoline taxes is not uniform. People who live in rural areas are far
more likely to pay that tax than people who live in New York City.
Indirect regulatory burdens also have complex distributional
consequences. Like the gasoline tax, these burdens only affect people who
consume the safety- or health-regulated product. Imagine a coal plant in
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the Midwest subject to stricter emissions controls. If those costs are passed
on in their entirety to consumers (rather than being partially borne by
shareholders in the form of lower dividends, a possibility Viscusi does not
acknowledge in sketching out his broad claims), they will indeed reduce
the income of Midwesterners. That is unfortunate, but will not be of
immediate concern to residents in New England, which draws a large share
of its electrical power from nuclear energy. Interestingly enough, they
happen to begrudge Midwestern industry for acid rain. 76
Another very serious problem anticipated by my eyeglasses example is
the presumed insensitivity of the propensity effect to the amount of
expenditure. An evenly distributed direct regulatory burden of $1 billion is
less than a penny a day. Does Professor Viscusi believe that this is likely
to lead to even a single loss of life? 77
The point here is not that there could not be a reduction in health
expenditure attendant to health and safety regulation. Rather, the
heterogeneity of any such reductions and their consequences simply cannot
be captured by applying Viscusi’s 0.1 figure across all regulatory domains
and populations. To be sure, actually tracing these effects with empirical
certainty would be a daunting task. I do not begrudge Viscusi for
attempting to address the risk-risk question efficiently, but must note that
this limits what we can do with his observations.
Finally, one cannot miss the one-way character of Viscusi’s analysis.
Viscusi acknowledges that regulations may have collateral benefits that
may offset the collateral risks on which he focuses. 78 Perhaps this is a
matter of comparative advantage, but I am at a loss to understand why an
economist would choose to focus on one side of an equation.
For example, space program enthusiasts regularly point out the many
technologies—Velcro, Tang, new radios, fuel cells—said to stem from our
explorations. While it would be difficult to quantify their economic effects,
it seems likely that the “We Spent $20 Billion Going Into Space and All
We Got Were These Lousy Paperweights!” position would be incomplete.
Where is the Tang in Viscusi’s analysis of environmental regulation? In
his paper, John Graham makes a similar elision with respect to indirect
burdens. 79 But, many of these are largely wealth-transferring, not wealth76

Acid Rain Impact Remains a Concern, CNN.COM , Mar. 21, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/science/03/26/acid.rain.report/index.html (last visited
Apr. 21, 2006).
77. This example is drawn from a similar observation by Ackerman and Heinzerling.
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 7, at 57-58.
78. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
79. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush
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destroying regulations. For example, requiring new low-sulfur fuels or
advanced smokestack scrubbers means more dollars flowing into the
sulfur-reduction and scrubber-manufacturing industries. I suspect these are
fairly profitable businesses in which to work. Of course, nothing is free.
Presumably, transactional friction will mean that transfers are not perfectly
efficient. But, this does not imply that the money simply disappears. And,
if there are even modest multiplier effects for those industries and workers
fortunate enough to benefit from regulation-induced demand, the net
effects may be positive.
I certainly can express no opinion on whether this is typically the case
with environmental regulations. But it is unfortunate that Professor Viscusi
focuses on the (broadly speaking) deregulatory implications of ancillary
risk tradeoffs. 80 “Benefit multiplier” effects may be harder to measure, but
from the perspective of causation, their propinquity to regulation seems
equal to the “risk-risk” tradeoffs Viscusi emphasizes. As someone who
welcomes economic insights into legal thought, it is frustrating to see
Viscusi giving political opponents of CBA—who assume it can only favor
big business—such an obvious opportunity.
One Nation Under Economists?
While I am very evidently not an economist, many of the concerns
sketched above may be described as methodological. It is only fair to
acknowledge that while I am comfortable with my intuitions (who isn’t?),
many of these concerns must penultimately be left to economists to resolve.
I say “penultimately” because the goal of the CBA project is to inform
and guide public decisionmaking. But those decisions are ultimately
political. The question is the extent to which CBA methodologies provide
the “right” answer. For a number of reasons, I find myself skeptical that
market preferences, even if accurately captured, ought to be imported into
all regulatory domains.
Viscusi makes an interesting point about why regulatory agencies might
validly use different VSLs for different populations.81 Returning to the
example of airline safety, airline passengers have higher incomes than
average, and correspondingly higher VSLs. 82 Viscusi suggests that when
considering emergency lighting, or other airline safety regulation, that these

Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006).
80. Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at XX.
81. See id. at XX.
82. Id.
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higher VSLs ought to be used. 83 Correspondingly, where a regulation is
addressed to the safety of the typical citizen, his lower VSL correctly
implies that less safety is due. 84
To the obvious equity concern this presents, Viscusi notes that airline
safety regulations are not funded from a public regulatory budget, but from
airlines. 85 I agree. Thus, if airline passengers really desire greater safety, it
is reasonable for gap-filling safety regulation to reflect this. 86
Other regulations might be described as market-substitutes.
Determining the optimal speed limit for a curvy stretch of road does not
supplement the terms of a private contract; only the government can make
that decision, and public policy is largely a matter of averages. Thus, use
of an average VSL (reflecting the typical user) is appropriate.
The question is the “fit” between market transactions in safety and the
demands citizens might make upon their government. Markets are truly
astonishing machines for aggregating and disseminating information. Their
capacity to describe external reality, however, is limited by the extent of
participation. Putting aside the methodological qualms I described earlier, I
assume market observations can tell us a great deal about what we might
expect of unobserved behavior of people in the market. These observations
may tell us little about people who are not in the market.
Suppose that the price of a good is $100. That figure is only informative
with respect to people who have at least $100. It does not tell us much
about the preferences of people who do not have that $100 to spend. I do
not argue that this is unfair, but merely observe that market-based
valuations necessarily exclude in their entirety the preferences of nonparticipants. I call these unregistered preferences “market undervotes.”
Market undervotes are problematic where public policy is determined by
expressed market preferences. Just as risky jobs are unlikely to be held by
women, they are unlikely to be held by relatively older people. Indeed,
they are less likely to be held by people who are risk-averse. What, then,
does a risky-job wage premium tell us about the risk preferences of these
other groups?
Of course, there are many less risky jobs held by other swathes of the
population, and Viscusi’s data addresses them. 87 Certainly, this must push

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at __.
86. Viscusi does not, however, address the proper VSL for people who rely on urban
buses or intercity bus transit, whose lower incomes surely would imply less safety
regulation.
87. See Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits, supra note 2, at __.
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our market valuation closer to the “true” (unobserved) preference of the
population. But, there are many people who do not work at all (the elderly
or infirm), 88 or who do not consume goods with high implied safety premia
(safe cars) as much as others. Observed market transactions can tell us
little about their true preferences.
Of course, we do have markets for determining such preferences—
politics. While I take seriously Viscusi’s challenge to make public policy
science-based (rather than based on public perception), it presents two
distinct types of problems. First, much of the “science” on which Viscusi
would have us rely depends on public perceptions. After all, what are
market data but the revealed preferences of some subset of the population?
Viscusi notes that it might very well be a bad idea to regulate dreaded (but
small) risks rather than larger, but less salient ones.89 I happen to agree,
but am unsure how to reconcile this with his stated confidence in those
same biases, clothed in market decisions.
For example, it has taken some time for the public to accept that HIVinfected persons do not pose a significant risk to those with whom they
have the normal social contacts incident to daily life. 90 However, there
remains a residue of dread, particularly where children are involved. I have
no doubt that were Viscusi to examine market data, supplemented with the
view from Greensboro, he would detect that known HIV-infected teachers
are paid less because many parents (despite knowing better, or perhaps not)
would rather their children be taught by non-HIV-infected individuals.
What are we to do with such information from a regulatory perspective?
On the one hand, it reflects an exaggerated risk perception (which may be
irrational, though not unreasonable). 91 However, an observed wage

88. One of the seemingly perverse insights of CBA is that we might value the lives of
the elderly less. Certainly, this is already true of tort law. Should it be true of regulatory
policy? Many environmental regulations return benefits to the elderly, who are more
susceptible to environmental risks. The “senior discount” has been reflexively criticized.
Let me confine myself to two observations. First, discounting does not appear to account
for the fact that the lives saved are often those of the present regulation-paying generation.
Whether I “owe” senior citizens better air quality than I currently require is a question
altogether different than whether I am willing to pre-fund my need for better air quality
thirty years from now. Second, Viscusi suggests that wage-risk premia for workers aged
fifty-five to sixty-two are not markedly different from those commanded by younger
workers. Id. at XX. Perhaps I am misreading this, but I do not see the relevance of this
observation. The fact is that such data tell us nothing whatsoever about the correct values to
be assigned people over the age of sixty-two, who are not in the workforce.
89. Id. at XX.
90. See, e.g., Richard Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information:
An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REV. 871, 888
(1989).
91. For discussion on this distinction, see Greg Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality
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differential is unmistakably a manifestation of some underlying reality.
Which reality should govern?
This problem suggests that one ought to comprehensively “correct”
observed data for all kinds of irrational preferences that the market does not
distinguish from rational ones. If it is true that minorities do not obtain
commensurate risk premia, these data might be treated as “market
undervotes” to be discarded in favor of data unaffected by systemic
racism. 92 If women are largely segmented into non-risky work (for reasons
other than their native risk aversion), then we must adjust these figures to
arrive at the “true” measure of wage-risk preference. It takes little
imagination to conceive of endless iterations of this theme, but a great deal
of imagination (not possessed by this observer) to see how this task could
be reliably accomplished.
Returning to politics, we see an equally plausible and arguably more
legitimate contender for discerning preferences: votes. Suppose fifty-one
percent of the voting public prefers to spend a sum equal to ten times the
average market-derived VSL for safety and proposes to extract this sum
from the wealthiest five percent of the public. Generally speaking, I would
find this pretty distasteful; Viscusi would be at his best, no doubt, in
illustrating why such a move might be far from ideal. But I cannot see how
this preference is not in fact the “correct” answer—where mathematical
correctness is largely a function of counting votes. Of course, we do not
subject most regulations to plebiscite, but in a democracy, agencies ought
to act upon the preferences of the people. Thus, if surveys or (preferably)
an annual vote established the majority’s willingness to spend the
minority’s money, this logically ought to provide the template for
regulatory calculus.
I cannot imagine that many readers will be very comfortable with this
observation. I certainly am not. But I offer it as a counterpoint to Viscusi’s
suggestion, implicit in the CBA project, that private market data clearly
provide the “right” answer to regulatory equations. One need not be a
relativist to see that there are a number of contenders for truth in valuing
life and safety. Moreover, economics does not seem immune to the
commonly possessed trait among academic disciplines of thinking that
society would be much better off if only it would listen to the discipline’s
insights. “One Nation Under Economists”93 is about as appealing as
governance by law professors. In this sense, CBA may without undue
in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
92. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1501, 1530-38 (2004) (noting race-variant preferences in investment decisions).
93. My apologies to Professor Glendon.
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cynicism be viewed as merely the latest venue-shifting game. On this
view, the participants relocate decision-making from messy (and often
incoherent, contradictory, and process-encrusted) public venues to the
OMB (pausing briefly at the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis). In other
words, to caricature only slightly then-Professor Breyer’s ideal risk
regulator, it turns out that the ideal risk regulator, insulated from the static
of public misperceptions is, well, Professor Breyer! 94
CONCLUSION
Professor Viscusi’s paper is modest; I believe he would say that he seeks
only to guide and inform decision-making, not substitute his judgment for a
risk-ignorant public. But the overall CBA project is positively Olympian in
its confidence; to derive arithmetic expressions of our diverse, conflicting,
and fundamentally ineffable values, it would have to be. I believe the
project is inevitable, and stress that I share its aspirations for rational public
policymaking. But I have the uneasy feeling that, like a previous Olympian
effort involving Mt. Ossa and Mt. Pelion (with which CBA’s layers of
inference have altogether too much in common), its confidence is
misplaced. 95

94. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
95. I do not agree with Sally Katzen’s suggestion that the time has come to put CBA
aside. Sally Katzen, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Where Should We Go From Here?, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. XX (2006). Indeed, my basic concern is that the state of the art—and
art it surely is—remains in its infancy. There is far too much uncertainty, often unexpressed
by CBA enthusiasts when decisions must actually be taken (careful qualifications abound in
the literature), to make of this project a reliable metric for determining public policy. It is a
guide, not a map.

